Robots execute their planned actions in the physical world to accomplish their goals. However, since the real world is partially observable and dynamic, failures may occur during the execution of their actions. These failures should be detected immediately, and the underlying reasons of these failures should be isolated to ensure robustness. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic and temporal model-based failure isolation method that maintains Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models (HHMMs) in order to represent and reason about different failure types. The underlying reason of a failure can be isolated efficiently by multi-hypothesis tracking.
INTRODUCTION
A monitoring system is pivotal in order to achieve goals robustly in the face of uncertainties. During the execution of plans, robots may face several types of failures (Karapinar et al., 2012) . A monitoring procedure should take place which can be in both plan and action level to detect these failures. Although detecting failures is one of the central problems for robust execution (Pettersson, 2005; Usug et al., 2012; Karapinar et al., 2013) , the robot should also identify the reason of the failures to efficiently recover from them. Isolation of a failure requires an inference process to find the underlying reason behind the failure. In this research, our focus is on a probabilistic failure isolation method. We address action execution failures that may arise due to hardware/sensor limitations, limited knowledge on some environmental features (Bouguerra et al., 2008) or external events.
Monitoring and reasoning about failures requires interpreting data from one or more sensors (e.g., vision, force, touch or pressure). Therefore, in order to detect a failure, the robot needs to interpret the scene and apply certain reasoning tools to come up with correct conclusions. A similar procedure should be applied in order to isolate a failure. To achieve accurate isolation, the robot needs to maintain a priori information on the models of failures that are likely to occur in the environment.
In some cases, the reason of the failure may not be directly related to the action in execution. The reason of the failure may be an undesired effect of a previous action that is executed by the robot or an external event. For example, in the blocks world domain, when the base block structure is not properly formed, the execution of a stack action on the existing tower may fail, and the whole structure may be completely destroyed. In order to isolate these types of failures, a temporal reasoning model is needed. Furthermore, there may be more than one cause of a failure. To deal with such cases, a probabilistic temporal model is required to identify the possible failure cases.
We propose a Hierarchical Hidden Markov Model (HHMM)-based isolation method to determine the cause of a failure. Our method includes parallel HHMMs representing different failure types that are being modelled. The HHMM model provides temporal analysis of states and propagates temporal failure information over time after a deviation occurs. Multiple hypotheses are tracked at the same time to identify the underlying cause in a probabilistic manner. Our main contribution in this paper is modelling each failure type as a distinct HHMM considering action-failure relations and using these models in parallel. This representation makes it possible to isolate several types of failures including persistent ones on a specific object or event. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, literature review on fault isolation is presented. Then, our proposed method is explained as a proof of concept. Finally, the paper is concluded.
Failure detection and isolation (diagnosis) is an intensively investigated issue for robot systems due to the need for safe plan execution (Pettersson, 2005; Fritz, 2005) . A common approach to detect failures is using an observer-based approach (Nan et al., 2008; Steinbauer and Wotawa, 2009) . In this approach, predefined models and inconsistencies between the expected and observed outcomes are checked to detect failures. Uncertainties may lead a robot to faulty situations. This is handled with semantic knowledgebased execution monitoring where the robot estimates a probability distribution according to its expectations (Bouguerra et al., 2007) .
Model-based failure diagnosis has been investigated by many researchers previously (Frank et al., 2000) . Structural abstraction is used for model-based diagnosis in an earlier work (Chittaro and Ranon, 2004 ). In some model-based fault detection and isolation systems, HMMs are used to monitor processes (Hovland and McCarragher, 1998) or to diagnose failures in different domains (Kwon and Kim, 1999; Ying et al., 2000; Ocak and Loparo, 2001; Ge et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Li et al., 2005) . However, none of these models uses hierarchical models. Dynamic Bayesian Networks and Particle Filters are also used for failure diagnosis (Flores-Quintanilla et al., 2005; Verma et al., 2004) . In another work (Verma et al., 2002a) , Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) and Particle Filters are used in order to model and track failures in autonomous systems. In another work, a hierarchical representation is used for failure diagnosis (Verma et al., 2002b) ; however, it can not handle multiple faults. Hierarchical HMMs are also used in prognostics for estimating remaining useful time (RUL) in machinery processes (Camci and Chinnam, 2010) .
Logic programming with situation calculus is also studied in order to explain the unexpected deviations in task execution depending on inconsistencies among the hypotheses using their costs (Gspandl et al., 2012) .
Our HHMM-based failure isolation method differs from earlier work because of its ability in recognizing failures hierarchically in parallel and its usage of relations between actions and failure types. Our system can determine that a failure may be caused by multiple fault sources, and it may provide several explanations for the cause of a failure if there is no clear indication of the failure. Moreover, persistent failures on a specific object or event can be isolated.
PROBABILISTIC FAILURE ISOLATION FOR ROBOTS
In the symbolic level, a robot maintains the models of its operators corresponding to the actions that it can execute in the real-world such as pick-up, stack, move and put-down. Each action is represented by a set of facts to be satisfied before executing it, namely preconditions, and its effects that occur in the world after the action is executed by the robot. In order to reach a desired goal, the robot should come up with a symbolic plan. After executing the consecutive actions in this plan, the robot is expected to reach its desired goal state. However, due to unexpected deviations, failures may prevent the robot from reaching its goal. When a failure is detected, the robot should reason about the main cause of the failure for robust execution. In order to safely end up with its goal state, the robot should apply a failure isolation procedure to analyse the faulty situation and find the reason of this failure. The main focus of our research is a failure isolation method to determine the reasons behind a failure after it is detected.
A Motivating Scenario
Assume that a robot is responsible for transporting objects to their desired positions in an object manipulation scenario. Initially, all objects are in their initial positions. The robot is capable of executing some actions, namely move-to-loc, pick-up, put-down and move-to-obj. move-to-loc is executed in order to move the robot from one location to another, whereas moveto-obj moves the robot to a desired object location. Action pick-up is executed on an object by the robot's gripper to grasp the object. Similarly, put-down is executed for releasing an object from the gripper on the ground. Considering these actions, the robot comes up with the following symbolic plan in order to move an object from its initial location to its desired location: [move-to-obj(object), pick-up(object), move-toloc(destination), put-down(object)]. After the execution of the constructed plan, the goal is achieved.
Several types of failures may be faced by the robot during the execution of its actions in the given plan. For example, the robot may fail in executing pick-up action on the object because of wrong grasp position or its size. Another failure may occur if the robot's vision system fails while recognizing the object. Yet in another scenario, the object may be manipulated by other agents without any a priori information. In such cases, the isolation model should give relevant explanations for the causes of these unexpected situations.
Hierarchical HMM-based Failure Isolation
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) (Baum and Petrie, 1966) are probabilistic temporal structures to model Markov processes. Since failures that occur during the execution of a plan generally propagate over time, the problem of identifying failures should be analysed from a temporal dimension. Furthermore, uncertainties in sensing and non-determinism of actions make HMM-based models suitable for the failure isolation problem. An HMM consists of five components, namely states, observations, transition probabilities, observation probabilities and the initial state distribution.
• There are N hidden states in an HMM. Each hidden state is denoted with s i ∈ S where S is the set of hidden states.
• Transition model, A = a i j , defines the probability of transferring from state s i to state s j where s i , s j ∈ S.
• Observations, denoted by the y t , represent the sensory information gathered at time t.
• Observation model, denoted by B = b s i (y), defines the probability of gathering the observation y at state s i .
• Initial state probability distribution is represented with π = π i .
An HHMM is a derived structure of an HMM in which each state in the model is itself an HMM (Fine et al., 1998) . Once a node at time step t is activated in the HHMM, a new HMM is created under the corresponding node for that time step. Transitions inside that newly created HMM in the lower level are called horizontal transitions. Whenever the newly generated HMM comes to an end, a vertical transition occurs, and the process of updating HHMMs goes on from the node in the corresponding upper level in the corresponding model. Note that a horizontal transition does not take place in the upper level before the newly created HMM reaches its final state.
In our approach, we employ two-level HHMMs running in parallel. The type of a failure that may occur during the execution of an action, is modelled as a distinct HHMM. HHMMs are used to represent failure models instead of classical HMMs because a hierarchy between the plan and actions is needed in order to isolate persistent failures. For instance, the robot's vision system may fail to recognize a specific object in the environment continually. Each model running parallel is denoted by M i ∈ M where i is the index of the corresponding failure type. Each state in M i is defined as M i [ws j ] where ws j is the representation of the world state at discrete time step j of the plan. Each M i [ws j ] in the models has a latent value that is either success or failure. The problem is to find models that include latent variables labelled with failure and have probabilities over a given threshold. These models are treated as possible reasons of a failure. Causes of action execution failures that are addressed in this paper are: vision failures for all objects, localization failures, hardware limitations (actuator/effector) and external events. Vision(X) is a failure model for a specific ob ject(X) representing a faulty situation in the vision algorithm to recognize a specific object. HardwareLimitation(actuator/effector) model indicates situations that are beyond the physical capabilities of the robot. ExternalEvent model stands for exogenous events that change the world outside the control of the robot. Localization failure model represents the faulty situations where the robot cannot correctly localize itself. Depending on the action that is being executed at a given world state and its parameters, the related failure models are activated and treated as active models where unrelated models are considered as passive models. The relations that define which action is related to which failure type are given in Table 1 for a specific object. The world state of the robot is maintained by using sensory and motor information. Table 2 lists the observable predicates of the world state that we consider and the related sensors providing the relevant data. object predicate is for representing the verified existence of an object. clear is for stating that the object has nothing on it. onground stands for the situation that an object is on the ground. segment corresponds to a point cloud clustered by the segmentation algorithm but not detected by the vision algorithm. These predicates are observed with the on-board RGB-D camera using a template-based vision algorithm in our system . handempty states that the robot's gripper is available to hold an object whereas holding is for stating that an object is grasped by the robot. Observation probabilities are defined regarding to the statistical analysis on the outputs of the sensors and the related predicate computations. A scene interpretation (Ozturk et al., 2014) module maintains these predicates in the robot's knowledge base, and updates them according to new observations. It should also be noted that transition and observation probabilities for different failure types are different from each other due to the difference in models.
Algorithm 1 FailureIsolation(P,M)
Input: P, Plan; M, Failure models Output: list, the list of the candidate causes of a failure while P = / 0 and status == success do action = POP(P) while (status = execute(action)) == inExecution do updateLowerLevelModels(M, action) end while applyVerticalTransition(M, ws j ) updateHigherLevelModels(M, action) end while for all M i do labelU pperLevelLatents(M i ) end for list = isolateModels(M) return list
Our failure isolation method is applied by running Algorithm 1. It accepts a plan and failure models as parameters. Plan P includes a sequence of actions to be executed by the robot. Failure models, represented with M, include parallel HHMM-based failure models. After the execution of the given algorithm, a list, initially empty, that contains possible candidates of a failure is returned. Actions in the given plan is executed consecutively. An action can be in one of the following states: inExecution, success and failure. inExecution corresponds to the state in which the robot executes that action. success stands for the state that the robot reached the expected outcomes of the corresponding action. failure corresponds to the situations where the expected outcomes of an action are not met.
During the execution of each action, all HHMMstructured models' lower levels related to the corresponding failure types are considered as active models, and updated by the updateLowerLevelModels(M,action). Predefined relations between actions (with their parameters) and failure types are used to determine whether the executed action is related to the failure type. If an action is related to a failure type, the corresponding failure type's HHMM is treated as an active model, and it is activated for that time step. Observations are gathered from the sensors of the robot (e.g., pressure sensor, RGB-D sensor, etc.), and these observations are mapped into a probability distribution which depends on the sensors' statistical analysis. Depending on the observations gathered at the current state, the new state's properties are calculated considering the previous state because of the Markov property with the following formulas where v t is the Viterbi value which is calculated for each time step t, and δ t is the state index that maximizes the given statement.
After the execution of the corresponding action, a vertical transition occurs with the applyVerticalTransition(M,S i ) function by using the minimum observation probability in the related model's lower layer for that action's time interval. updateHigherLevelModels(M,action) updates all HHMMs' upper levels considering the action-failure relations. This procedure is implemented in Algorithm 2. This algorithm updates all related models according to the action in execution and its current outcomes. In order to infer action-failure relations, the predefined relations (Table 1 ) and the parameters of the executed action are used. In an active model case, a new state is generated and the v t (s i ) and δ t (s i ) values are updated according to the given formulas. Otherwise, if a failure model is not related to the action in execution, it is treated as a passive model, and the last state of the corresponding HHMM's time interval is extended without generating a new state.
This procedure goes on until the robot reaches the goal state or a failure is detected. We assume that failure detection is done by applying an observer-based approach. In case of a failure, labelUpperLevelLatents(M i ) procedure assigns the hidden values of each state in the upper level of the model by using the Viterbi algorithm (Viterbi, 1967 HMM and labels the latent variables for each node considering the calculated v and δ values during the execution of the plan. At the end of the Algorithm 1, a list that contains the possible causes of the failure with a probability exceeding a given threshold is returned with the Algorithm 3. Figure 1 is given in order to give the general overview of using parallel HHMMs for failure isolation. Upper level in the figure represents the symbolic plan given to the robot. Under this plan, a failure model (M i ) represented as an HHMM. In this HHMM, each top node has its own HMM. During the execution of action 1 , the first top node of the model's lower level HMM is updated with the sensory information (y t ). After mapping each observation in each discrete time step into a probability distribution by using conditional probability tables (CPTs), properties of the newly generated node of the HMM are computed. This procedure is repeated similarly for the other related failure models considering the actionfailure relations. In case of a failure, Viterbi algorithm is invoked, and the candidate models explaining the faulty situation are determined.
Algorithm 3 isolateModels(M)

CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a temporal model for failure isolation that maintains HHMMs. HHMMs are used for modelling the possible failure types. Using the temporal filtering property of the HMMs, failures that occur because of a previously executed action can efficiently be isolated. Using the relations between the actions and the failure types, only corresponding models are updated. This reduces the computational cost of the method. Moreover, HHMMs ensure isolation of multiple faults and propose explanations for possible faulty situations. Our future work includes evaluation of the proposed method in several real robot scenarios.
